This paper investigates the weaknesses of cryptosystems that use observer based synchronized chaotic systems. It is shown that known plaintext and chosen plaintext attacks can successfully be launched against such cryptosystems to recover the system parameters and subsequently eavesdrop on the message transmission. The methods employed rely only on the basic mathematical relations that exist between the output sequence and the message sequence of the transmitter system and require very less computations.
Introduction
Starting with the observation that chaotic systems can be coupled to yield synchronized chaotic signals, there has been an increasing research activity from various disciplines on chaos synchronization and its possible applications to secure communications [Pecora & Caroll, 1990; Hasler, 1998 ].
Many different proposals have appeared in the literature on how to employ chaotic systems in secure communication schemes. This ranges from using chaotic systems as pseudorandom number generators to be used in a stream cipher to using chaotic signals as wide-band carriers modulated by the message [Kolumbán et al., 1998; Hasler, 1998 ].
Topological properties of chaotic systems make them promising candidates for pseudorandom number generators. Basically the sensitive dependence of system trajectories on the initial state makes it possible to use the initial state as the seed and the (possibly quantized) trajectory as the pseudorandom sequence [Stojanovski & Kocarev, 2001] . Such a use is similar to a cryptosystem involving a one-time pad. Still, for a particular chaotic system employed in this manner, the statistical properties of the resulting sequence need to be verified against randomness tests [Menezes et al., 1996] .
Another more common use of chaotic systems in encryption involves the modulation of some of the system signals by the message. Treating the system parameters as the secret key that is shared between the transmitter and the intended receiver, the security of the cryptosystem relies on the sensitive dependence of chaotic trajectories on the system parameters. It is generally assumed that an eavesdropper who does not know the system parameters cannot possibly construct a copy of the receiver system so as to decipher messages [Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001; Lian et al., 2000] . As Pecora's seminal work [Pecora & Caroll, 1990] , sparked a growing interest in chaos synchronization, a class of chaos synchronization problems was shown to be equivalent to the problem of observer design for nonlinear systems [Morgül & Solak, 1996] . Basically, the synchronizing signal is viewed as the transmitter system output and the receiver system is designed as an observer. This realization brought about the adoption of many classical observer design techniques to chaos synchronization and some observer based cryptosystems have appeared in the literature, e.g. [Grassi & Mascolo, 1999; Jiang, 2002; Yang & Chua, 1996] . This paper shows that observer based cryptosystems are vulnerable to known plaintext attacks and that a passive attacker listening to the public communication channel can recover the secret system parameters and use them to decrypt the subsequent transmission. Interestingly, the attacks do not make use of the fact that the underlying dynamical systems are chaotic but rather exploit the dependencies between the input and the output sequences. As a concrete illustration three attacks are proposed and analyzed for the cryptosystems proposed in [Lian et al., 2000] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the class of cryptosystems considered. Section 3 outlines the general method of the attack against the discrete-time chaotic cryptosystems. Section 4 illustrates known plaintext attacks for two cryptosystems and Sec. 5 gives a chosen plaintext attack. Finally Sec. 6 gives some concluding remarks.
Discrete-Time Chaotic Cryptosystem
The rest of the paper considers the class of cryptosystems proposed in [Lian et al., 2000] . At the transmitter end of the cryptosystem the following chaotic system is used to mask the message:
where X ∈ R n is the state, m ∈ R is the message, y ∈ R is the output and the matrices A, M 1 , M 2 and the functions f, h are of appropriate dimensions. Note that the message m(k) modulates the state X(k) as well as the output y(k). Depending on the choice of the gains M 1 and M 2 , different encryption strategies result. For the sake of cryptanalysis, it is natural to assume that the parameterized forms of the functions f and h are known but the parameter values are secretly shared between the sender and the intended receiver. This view also accords with the Kerchoff's principle which states that the security of a cryptosystem should reside in the secrecy of the key, not in the secrecy of the algorithm [Menezes et al., 1996] . Furthermore, it is easier to guarantee that the system (1) has chaotic solutions if its functional form is fixed and its parameters are adjusted accordingly.
Three different cases of the transmitter system (1) are considered;
The output y(k) of the system (1) is transmitted through an insecure channel to the receiver. At the receiver we construct an observer system aŝ
The gain vector L is chosen so as to make the state
Note that, using the secretly shared parameters the intended receiver is able to implement the functions f, h and the matrix A in (2). It is implicitly assumed that the chaotic nature of the transmitted signal would prevent an eavesdropper from reconstructing the message without the knowledge of the unknown parameters related to f and h.
In the sequel we are going to show that known plaintext and chosen plaintext attacks can successfully be launched against this cryptosystem to recover the system parameters and hence the message. The methods we use rely only on basic mathematical relations that exist in the transmitter system and require minimum amount of computations. Another interesting result is that even when the recovered parameters are only approximate, it is still possible to obtain fairly good message reconstruction.
Reconstruction of the Chaotic System Parameters
Consider the general form of the system (1). Without loss of generality we can assume that the matrix A does not have any secret parameters. Let the functions f and g be parameterized by the parameter vectors θ f and θ h which are k f and k h dimensional, respectively. In the known plaintext attack an eavesdropper records the output sequence y(k) and the message sequence m(k) (known plaintext). The secret quantities (keys) about the system (1) are the parameter vectors θ f and θ h , the initial state X(0) and the injection gains M 1 and M 2 . Hence, in total, the eavesdropper has N = 2n + k f + k h + 1 unknowns to determine using an appropriate number of output measurements. Excluding the cases of redundant information at the output, observing N output and message measurements enables an eavesdropper to form N nonlinear equations involving those unknowns. For the sake of observer based cryptosystems it is enough for the eavesdropper to be able to solve these equations only for θ f and θ h because the initial state is not needed to recover the message. Indeed, the (global) observer used at the receiver end converges to the true state of the transmitter system independently of the initial states. In some cases, depending on the particular structure of the transmitter system, less than N equations might be enough to uniquely determine the parameters θ f and θ h . It is interesting to note that the attack does not make use of the chaotic nature of the transmitter system. Instead we exploit the dependence of the infinite output sequence on the finite set of system parameters and the initial state. In such a setting, given a sufficiently large but finite subsequence of the output sequence, it is intuitive to expect to invert the mapping from the parameters to that output subsequence. Although it is in general difficult to derive an analytical expression for the map between the parameters and the output, the following two sections illustrate the methodology of the attack with examples which correspond to the cases examined in [Lian et al., 2000] .
Known Plaintext Attack
First example corresponds to the first case examined in [Lian et al., 2000] . Example 1. Consider the following chaotic transmitter system
For this particular system we show how a known plaintext attack can successfully be launched to find three secret parameters α, β, γ. The other three unknowns about the system (3) are the initial states x 1 (0), x 2 (0), x 3 (0) but they are not needed to be able to construct an observer based receiver. After the first message and output measurements we obtain the relation
Similarly, the output and message measurements at time k = 1 yield the equation
Writing out output relations in this fashion up to k = 5 and using x 1 (k + 1) = y(k) yield four more equations: (4) y(4) − m(4) = γ + βy(2) − βy(1) + αy 2 (3), (5) y(5) − m(5) = γ + βy(3) − βy(2) + αy 2 (4). (6) Equations (4)- (6) can be written in matrix form as
where
As long as R is invertible, the unknown parameter vector u can be determined as u = R −1 v which is the unique solution to (7). Once the eavesdropper has the system parameters an exponential observer can be constructed to decipher the subsequent transmission. Namely, equipped with the transmitter parameters α, β, γ an observer can be constructed similar to the one the intended receiver uses to decipher the communication. Note that although three equations are enough to determine the unknown parameters we needed to use all of the six measurement pairs to form R and v.
Remark 2. The attack illustrated in the previous example is robust in the sense that even if the parameters are determined up to small errors the subsequent decryption process can reconstruct messages with a proportionate loss of accuracy rather than a total loss of synchronization. This property is a result of the exponential stability of the error system. Namely, exponential stability of a dynamical system is robust against small parameter perturbations in its parameters [Khalil, 2001] .
A similar attack can be launched against the other two cases examined in [Lian et al., 2000] . The basic method remains the same; deriving an appropriate mapping from the parameters (and possibly including the initial states) to the measured output sequence and then inverting it. For the sake of completeness we apply the method to the other two cases as well.
Example 3. Consider the same system in Example 1 with a different output and expressed in a form corresponding to C.2:
where m 1 , m 2 , m 3 are the components of the vec-
In this case the nonlinearity in the system is a function of the output only. We wrote the system in a slightly different way than that in [Lian et al., 2000] because our main interest is in the reconstruction of the secret parameters rather than achieving the synchronization of the transmitter and the receiver systems. However, once those secret parameters are determined, a synchronized observer at the receiver can readily be constructed to eavesdrop on the subsequent communication. This time there are three more parameters to be determined; m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , which bring about three more equations. Hence breaking the new cipher is a little bit more difficult but only so much.
Writing out the output sequence one gets the following equations relating the unknown parameters γ, β, α, m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , to the measurements.
and in general for k ≥ 0 we have
Writing (9) for k = 0, . . . , 8 we form the set of linear equations as a matrix equality:
y (3) y (4) y (5) y (6) y (7) y(8)
The unknown parameters are once again found by u = R −1 v. This time we needed just three more measurement pairs to obtain a linear system of equations in terms of the parameters.
Chosen Plaintext Attack
The last example corresponds to the case C.3 proposed in [Lian et al., 2000] . Basically it is still possible to use known plaintext attack for this case but the resulting nonlinear equations for the unknown parameters increase its computational complexity. Instead, by a careful choice of the plaintext one can obtain a set of linear equations.
Example 4. Consider the following chaotic system at the transmitter:
Writing out the output sequence one gets the following equations relating the unknown parameters to the measurements.
The rest of the measurements after step 3 satisfies
In order to have as many equations as the number of unknowns, (10) must be written out up to k = 5. In this case we do not have a neat set of linear equations in terms of unknown parameters. One might have to resort to the numerical solution of the set of nonlinear equations. However, allowing a chosen plaintext attack, it is possible to simplify (10) to yield linear equations. For this purpose we construct the plaintext as m = { * , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}.
Substituting this message in (10) we get y(3) = βy(1) − βy(0) + γ + αy 2 (2) (11) y(4) = βy(2) − βy(1) + γ + αy 2 (3) (12) y(5) = βy(3) − βy(2) + γ + αy 2 (4) (13) y(6) = βy(4) − βy(3) + m 2 + γ + α(y(5) + m 1 ) 2 (14) y(7) = βy(5) + βm 1 − βy(4) + m 3 + γ + αy 2 (6) (15) y(8) = βy(6) − βy(5) − βm 1 + γ + αy 2 (7).
We can solve the linear set (11)-(13) to find α, β, γ and substitute those in (15), (16) Hence this particular cipher can be broken using a chosen plaintext attack with a sequence of plaintext of length 8. As before, once the eavesdropper determines the set of parameters α, β, γ, m 1 , m 2 , m 3 used at the transmitter system, a copy of the receiving observer can be constructed to listen to the subsequent transmission.
Conclusion
The strength of synchronized chaos based encryption algorithms is investigated. It is found that such algorithms are very weak against known plaintext attacks. The amount of plaintexts needed to recover the system parameters is linearly proportional to the system dimension. Moreover, it is shown that by an appropriate choice of plaintexts in a chosen plaintext attack, the computational complexity of the attack can be reduced to yield a simple set of linear equations. Although the focus of the present work is on discrete-time chaotic systems, similar techniques can be employed to launch attacks against continuous-time chaotic cryptosystems. The investigation in this area is underway and will be reported in a future communication.
